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The nation-state and international law: a reading from the Global 
South 
In this article we re-describe the relationship between international law and the 
nation-state, reversing the usual imagined directionality of the flow between the 
two. At its most provocative, our argument is that rather than international law 
being a creation of the state, making the state is an ongoing project of 
international law. In the article, we draw on the example of the institutionalised 
project of development to illuminate the ways in which international law creates, 
and maintains nation-states, and then recircXODWHVIURPDSRLQWµZLWKLQ¶WKHP 
Keywords: nation-state; international law; development; post-colonial state; 




 A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a fact in the 
sense in which it may be said that a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status 
attaching to a certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules or 
practices.1  
 
International interventions of all kinds ± humanitarian, military, developmental, and 
financial ± DUHXVXDOO\SUHGLFDWHGRQWKHLGHDWKDWDVWDWHZKLFKKDVHPHUJHGIURPµWKH
SHRSOH¶µZLWKLQ¶LVEHLQJµDVVLVWHG¶IURPµRXWVLGH¶± to develop, to overcome civil war, 
to govern itself better. Such interventions are neither imagined, nor constructed in law, 
DVDFWLRQVZKLFKLPSRVHDQGVWDELOLVHDOHJDOIRUPµWKHQDWLRQ-VWDWH¶IURPµRXWVLGH¶
GLVFLSOLQLQJLWIURPµZLWKLQ¶WRDFWXDOLVHDQGPDLQWDLQWKDWSDUWLFXODUIRUP,QGHHGWKH
authority of international law, as well as the operation of the international legal order, 
rely on the twin myths which ground this reading: first, that states are independent 
juridical-LQVWLWXWLRQDOIRUPDWLRQVWKDWFRPHLQWREHLQJRQFHWKH\DUHIRUPHGLQµIDFW¶DQG
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ZKLFKDUHRQO\ODWHUµUHFRJQLVHG¶DVDPDWWHURILQWHUQDWLRQDO law; and second, that 
sovereign states come before a law which they have consensually created.2 A classic 
WH[WERRNVWDWHPHQWUHIOHFWLQJWKLVP\WKLFJURXQGLQJPLJKWEHµ>L@QLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ«
it is the states themselves that create the law and obey or GLVREH\LW¶3 And yet this 
predicate is not only mythic, but fictional; a fiction which conceals the world-making 
work of international law and institutions, a work now intensifying in both scope and 
violence. 
 
In this article we re-describe the relationship between international law and the 
nation-state, reversing the imagined directionality of the flow that sequences nation-
states as coming first and international law second.4 At its most provocative, our 
argument is that rather than international law being a creation of the state, making and 
remaking the state is a project of international law. We draw here on the example of the 
institutionalised project of development to illuminate the ways in which international 
law creates and maintains nation-states, DQGWKHQUHFLUFXODWHVIURPDSRLQWµZLWKLQ¶
them. Understanding this process is particularly important when trying to make sense of 
the pasts and presents of the Global South, but is increasingly relevant to understanding 
reconfigurations of states in the North too. 
 
In order to advance our argument, we offer a sketch of the intimate relationship 
between the international development project and nation-states over time. We begin in 
Part I with a brief outline of the shaping of international legal relations through the 
constitution of first colonial and then post-colonial states. In Part II, we describe how 
WKHVHSRVWFRORQLDOVWDWHVEHFDPHµGHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWHV¶WKURXJKDQGLQWDQGHPZLWK
the emergence of the international development project after World War II (WWII). In 
Part III, we describe the transitional moment of the 1980s and early 1990s during which 
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WKHVHRULJLQDORUµROG¶GHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWHVZHUHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRµQHZGHYHORSPHQWDO
VWDWHV¶7KLVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWRRNVKDSHLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHUHVSective demands of first, 
what we know now as the Washington Consensus, and then of its successor, the Post-
Washington Consensus. In Part IV, we describe the shape and shaping of the new 
developmental state itself. In this section, we pay particular attention to how the making 
and re-making of these new developmental states is an ongoing project that increasingly 
shapes everyday life in the Global South. In the concluding section, we restate the 
argument, but gesture too, toward further shifts in practices of state making, and the 
increasing developmentalisation of the Global North. 
 
Although the histories of the state, of international law, and of the development 
project that we offer here are for the most part, well known, our aim in this article is to 
read them together in order to show how the state has become the legal form through 
which the promises of international law, including the promise of development, ground 
themselves in the human and natural fabric of the world. In offering this re-description, 
we hope to draw out the practices which both shape and pathologise the state in the 
Global South ± and increasingly in the Global North too ± as well as to invite reflection 
on alternative ways of thinking about the study and the political practice of both 
statecraft and international law. 
 
I. International law and the (post)colonial state 
 
Since its relative triumph over rival forms of political association in seventeenth century 
Europe,5 one of the main features of the nation-state has been bringing together, and 
giving jurisdictional coherence to, diverse geographical spaces and population groups. 
This has facilitated productive relations and the extraction of value from both humans in 
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the form of labour and the natural environment in the form of resources.6 And yet this 
H[HUFLVHRIDXWKRULW\RYHUµQDWLRQDO¶WHUULWRULHVDQGSRSXODWLRQKDVDOZD\VEHHQ
UHODWLRQDO)RUDOWKRXJKWKHLGHDRIDQµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶RUGHUZDVFRQVROLGDWHGRQO\
towards the end of the eighteenth century, from their inception, nation-states worked not 
only to discipline the multiplicity of social groups and economic and legal 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVWKDWH[LVWHGµZLWKLQ¶WKHLUERXQGDULHVEXWDOVRWRJHQHUDWHDVXSUD-
national landscape ± an international legal order ± in which conflicts, trade, and 
overseas expansion could be negotiated.7 $V$QQH2UIRUGKDVDUJXHGµFRQVWLWXWLQJ
RUGHU¶KDVEHHQDFHQWUDOSUHRFFXSDWLRQRIERWKQDWLRQ-states and international law from 
the seventeenth century to the present day.8  
 
Within the European context, the Ius Publicum Europaeum provided the 
framework for the emergence of states and the elements of proper international 
behaviour for the new nations.9 As offspring of both the Enlightenment and European 
colonial expansion, the Ius Publicum Europaeum and the nation-state reflected the 
social transformations and Eurocentric cultural understandings prevailing at the time. 
Nation-states were, for example, the sites in which old monarchies and an expanding 
bourgeoisie managed to accommodate and multiply their interests under a new 
institutional logic and in new patterns of world making.10 The principles of rational 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFDIIDLUVWKDWFDPHWRV\PEROLVH(XURSH¶VLGHDRI
civilization were also first put into practice within the context of European nation-
states.11 When the Ius Publicum Europaeum travelled with European powers to the 
SHULSKHU\VREHFRPLQJRXUFXUUHQWµLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶LQVWHDGRIEHLQJMXVWWKHµSXEOLF¶
law or law of encounter between European nations),12 LWµXQLYHUVDOLVHG¶ZLWKLWVHOIWKH
jurisdictional practices by which the colonies could be ordered according to a 
Eurocentric national logic. 
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Nineteenth century Swiss jurist, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808±1881) 
exemplifies this universalising Eurocentric impulse in his work The Theory of the 
State.13 According to Bluntschli: 
 
The highest idea of the State is beheld when the tendency of human nature to 
political society is considered, and the highest conceivable and possible 
development of this tendency is regarded as the political end of mankind.14  
 
For Bluntschli the state was both a natural expression of the way political communities 
were organised, and the means through which these communities achieved their highest 
GHJUHHRIPDWHULDODQGVSLULWXDOSHUIHFWLRQ,QWKLVVWRU\µ>Z@KLOVWKLVWRU\H[SODLQVWKH
RUJDQLFTXDOLW\RIWKH6WDWH¶ZHOHDUQIURPLWWRRµWKDWWKH6WDWHGRHVQRWVWDQGRQWKH
same grade with the lower organisms of plants and animalVEXWLVRIDKLJKHUNLQG¶15 
$V%OXQWVFKOLSXWVLWWKHVWDWHµLVDPRUDODQGVSLULWXDORUJDQLVPDJUHDWERG\ZKLFKLV
capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts of the nation, of uttering them 
LQODZVDQGUHDOLVLQJWKHPLQDFWV¶16 µ7KHglory and honour of the State have always 
HOHYDWHGWKHKHDUWRILWVVRQVDQGDQLPDWHGWKHPWRVDFULILFHV¶17 
 
Notwithstanding the elevation of the state by Bluntschli and many of his 
contemporaries, European expansion to the rest of the world was not accompanied by 
an immediate recognition of a right of non-European populations to organise themselves 
into independent nation-states. Colonial expansion operated, instead, through 
differential modes of rule, in which Europe persistently claimed predominance for itself 
vis-à-YLVSHULSKHUDOSHRSOHVDQGWKHµFRORQLDO¶VWDWHVWKDWLWFUHDWHG18 The duty to 
&KULVWLDQLVHWKH6WDQGDUGRI&LYLOL]DWLRQDQGWKH:KLWH0DQ¶V%XUGHQDFFRPSDQLHG
by concepts such as terra nullius, and the rights to passage, to trade, to settle and to self-
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defense, together exemplify the jurisdictional constructions which brought colonial 
subjects and territories under the realm of European empires.19 These discursive and 
legal constructions established hierarchies first, between central and peripheral subjects, 
and later between modern and backward nation-states. And so by the end of the 
nineteenth century, after three centuries of intense colonial expansion across Africa, 
Asia, the Americas and the Pacific, it was no longer possible for non-European peoples, 
LQFOXGLQJIRUODUJHDQGµPRGHUQ¶SROLWLHVOLNHWKH2WWRPDQHPSLUHWRUHODWHWR(XURSH




International law and international lawyers ± which were also coalescing as both 
field and profession in the nineteenth century ± ZHUHLQVWUXPHQWDOLQ(XURSH¶V
reorganisation of the world. As Mazower has shown, during this period, international 
ODZ\HUVµFUHDWHGDQHZODQJXDJHIRU(XURSHDQVWDWHV«WRDVVHVVHDFKRWKHU¶VFODLPVWR
FRORQLDOWHUULWRULHV¶DQGIRUµUHVFXLQJWKHPLVVLRQRIHPSLUHIURPLWVGDUNHUGLUWLHU
VLGH¶22 Based on their belief in the superiority of European civilization and their 
recognition of the existence of very different cultures and societies around the world 
PRVWRIWKHPFRQVLGHUHGWREHµEDUEDULF¶RUHYHQµVDYDJH¶E\(XURSHDQVWDQGDUGV
international lawyers concluded that European states had not only an inherent right, but 
DOVRDQKLVWRULFUHVSRQVLELOLW\µWROHDGWKHZRUOGRQWKHEDVLVRIDVHWRf supposedly 
XQLYHUVDOUXOHV¶23 The expansion of (European) economic interests, (European) culture, 
and (European) statehood formed tKHFRUHRIWKHVHµXQLYHUVDO¶UXOHVUXOHVWKDW
international lawyers in the South also began to embrace and adapt as their nations 
gained independence.24 Encapsulating this deployment of justifications and moral 





As many critical international legal scholars have argued in recent years, this 
international ordering based on a µG\QDPLFRIGLIIHUHQFH¶26 ± between the apparent 
superiority of Europe and the partial or total inferiority of its others ± was neither 
µPHUHO\¶DGLVFXUVLYHFRQVWUXFWLRQQRUDµJHQWOH¶DUUDQJHPHQW27 This international order 
structured the way peripheral territories were administered and economically exploited, 
and how they were later integrated, for example, into the international institutional 
UHDOPRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\EHJLQQLQJZLWKWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶0DQGDWH6\VWHP
and later the United NationV¶7UXVWHHVKLS&RXQFLO7KURXJKWKHVHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
institutional frames, colonial possessions were understood according to a global ranking 
system ± DµXQLYHUVDOVWDQGDUGRISURJUHVV¶± in which their level of subordination 
depended on how distant they were understood to be from the ideal embodied in the 
µFRUH¶QDWLRQV28 In this context, statehood ± recognition as an independent, self-
determined nation-state ± became the formal benchmark for assessing the moment when 
a colonial population moved from the condition of savagery or barbarism, to 
membership of the international family of nations. 
 
7KHRXWFRPHRIFRORQLDOVXEMHFWV¶VWUXJJOHVDJDLQVWWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHPHWURSROHV
was, therefore, not the right to decide for themselves the mode in which they could 
organise their political communities and economic relations after independence.29 
,QVWHDGRIDULJKWWRµVHOI-GHILQLWLRQ¶WKHRXWFRPHRIWKHSURFHVVRIGHFRORQLVDWLRQZDV
WKHSULQFLSOHRIµVHOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶ZKLFKFRXOGEHSUDFWLFHGRQO\ZLWKLQWKHFRQILQHV 
of the nation-state form, and often according to pre-established colonial boundaries that 
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enclosed in single national formations highly disparate ethnic groups and incongruous 
geographical spaces.30 
 
At the same time, the doctrine of self-determination brought post-colonial 
nation-states into being within the context of an already highly elaborated global 
political economy. From their inception then, post-colonial nation-states were not only 
forced to fit their social realities within a foreign institutional and administrative frame, 
the European nation-state, but also had to perform within a particular international 
economic system. This system was one in which they had already been conditioned to 
the position of producers of primary commodities, dependent on the industrial 
production of centre-nations, and in which they were already highly indebted to the 
global financial system which had lent them the resources to fight their wars of 
independence, set up new national bureaucracies and establish their armies.31  
 
II. The old developmental state 
  
$OWKRXJKµFRQVFULSWHG¶WRWKHQDWLRQ-state form, post-colonial and peripheral states were 
determined to refuse the predicament of their own history.32 So when the promise of 
development was issued in 1949 by United States President Truman, and the highly 
novel post-WWII international institutional apparatus began to embrace the idea of 
development,33 national leaders across the South took up the challengHWRµGHYHORS¶
their territories and populations.34 Their ambition was to board the train of modernity, 
and to demonstrate that their apparent inferiority vis-à-vis Northern nations was not 
UHODWHGWRWKHLUHVVHQWLDOFXOWXUHRUUDFH7\SLFDOO\WKLVµEDFNZDUGQHVV¶ZDVH[SODLQHG
either to be an expression of their incipient economies (i.e. poor infrastructure, low 
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productivity, lack of industries, and insufficient human capital),35 or related to the 
µEDFNZDUGHOHPHQWV¶ZLWKLQWKHVWDWHVXFKas indigenous and rural people,36 or some 
combination of both.37  
 
At this point, the international order also became both highly nationalistic and 
state-centric, features that shaped the ambitions of leaders in the South.38 The 
understanding operative since the emergence of the state in the seventeenth century ± 
that states could always disappear entirely through invasion, war or treaty ± changed 
drastically in 1945 with the UN Charter.39 7KDWGRFXPHQWDFFRUGHGWRVWDWHKRRGµD
SURWHFWHGVWDWXVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶40 In this new international legal order, it was 
clear that at least in formal terms, once statehood was achieved by nations, national 
leaders had enduring authority and a wide scope of action.41 µ,QWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ZDV
confirmed, in turn, as the legal regime governing the relationships between states which 
were equal in law (de jure). Hence, in this understanding, international law underpinned 
a nation-VWDWH¶VRZQµVRYHUHLJQ¶ODZDQGLWRSHUDWHGDVDQDWLRQ-VWDWH¶VEDVHODZ7KLV
µMXULVGLFWLRQDO¶JURXQGLQJFDUULed with it, however, significant limitations for any 
substantive redistribution of resources across nations.42 Its state-centrism also put paid 
WRDQ\VHULRXVFRQWHPSODWLRQUHJDUGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶VSRWHQWLDOWREHFRPHWKHODZ
of a world government ± an idea that was present in many fora at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.43  
 
Acting on the basis of nation-VWDWHV¶QHZIRXQGSURWHFWLRQVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDO
law after WWII, as well as their desire to develop and catch up with WKHLUµPRGHUQ¶
Northern peers, post-colonial national leaders began to launch National Development 
Plans, nation-wide education and health programs, and massive infrastructure and 
industrial projects.44 Large irrigation schemes, dams, refineries, bridges and power 
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plants, as well as state-backed industrial initiatives, began to appear in countries as 
diverse as Kenya, India, South Korea, the Philippines, Peru, Egypt and Singapore. 
These schemes became emblems of the emergence of what we now identify as the 
µGHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWH¶45 The repeal of old statues from the colonial era, new national 
legislation in the areas of banking, administrative, labour and commercial law, and 
reforms to the judiciary and to legal education, also became fundamental instruments in 
the construction of nation-states dedicated to the enterprise of development.46  
 
Although the concept of the developmental state is today often associated only 
with the success stories of East and South-East Asian countries (e.g. South Korea and 
Thailand), the union between the idea of development and strong nation-states was as 
intense in most other Southern states from the 1950s onwards, as it was in these 
emblematic places. Even many Latin American states, which had already accumulated a 
century or so of independent republican history, were in many ways reborn at this point, 
based on the idea of development and their own vision of how best to alight the train of 
modernity.47 Key examples here include the Import Substitution Industrialization 
strategies of the 1950s, and later, from the mid-1960s, the dependency theory of 
development.48  
 
However, the emergence of developmental states was not only marked by the 
difficulties of actualising a general European nation-state form in the economically 
constrained and culturally diverse South. Developmental states also amalgamated in 
their operation the sometimes conflicting, ideological and institutional trends that had 
marked the evolution of European nation-states over the previous three centuries.49 
Thus the developmental state took shape as a commanding, highly centralised and 





task, in particular for those states under the sphere of influence of the United States. 
5RVWRZ¶VµVWDJHV¶WKHRU\RIIHUHGDIRUPXODE\ZKLFKµWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLHWLHV¶QRZFDOOHG
µGHYHORSLQJ¶FRXQWULHV¶FRXOGDFKLHYHµPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶YLDHFRQRPLFVSHFLDOLVDWLRQ
capitalist accumulation and sustained consumption.51 In this way, for Southern states, 
development became a fitting framework of operation. It gave them the ability to 
organise and, most importantly, to present themselves as unitary entities within the 
international order that had emerged from WWII. The result of this process was that all 
public actions eventually became associated with the idea of development, fusing 
together international aspirations and domestic actions.52 
 
From the 1950s to the mid-1980s, this marriage between the nation-state and 
development acquired a particularly important function in global affairs. During this 
time, UN membership grew from 51 to 159 members, most of whom were understood 
DVµXQGHUGHYHORSHG¶7KHJOREDOSRODULVDWLRQJHQHUDWHGE\WKH&ROG:DUQHLWKHU
threatened the role assigned to the figure of the nation-state in what was now known as 
the Third World, nor negated the call for the modernisation of Third World subjects. On 
the contrary, in both its capitalist and communist variants (although with different 
horizons in mind) the idea of development remained intimately linked to the figure of 
the nation-state and the need to culturally reshuffle Third World national citizenries.53 
And so, in the Cold War charged environment and increasingly debt-laden international 
economic order, the Eurocentric, mythically Westphalian sovereign-state was thus 
FRQVROLGDWHGDVµWKHDJHQWRIGHYHORSPHQW¶ across the postcolonial world.54  
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As the second half of the twentieth century progressed, however, a generalised 
anxiety over the need to control territories and populations that had characterised the 
developmental state since its emergence, contributed to the rise of an infamous wave of 
dictatorships and authoritarian governments in the Americas, Africa, the Subcontinent 
and South-East Asia, often with the support of Northern powers.55 This anxiety was an 
expression and reflection of both the confluence of international development norms 
and institutions around the building of modern and developed nation-states, as well as 
the surfacing of intense internal resistance to development programmes. National 
governments, staffed by increasingly heavy-handed figures, became even more fixated 
on centrally generated, top-down development projects and on the extension of 
µQDWLRQDO¶ORJLFVRYHUWKHH[LVWLQJVSDWLDODQGKXPDQODQGVFDSHRIWKHLUQDWLRQV7KH
disastrous financial, social, and natural consequences that flowed from many of these 
heavy-handed initiatives were to act as triggers for even stronger resistance to the idea 
of development, by this point identified in many corners of the South as an expression 
oIZKDW.ZDPH1NUXPDKKDGFRPHWRFDOOµQHR-colonialiVP¶56  
 
III. A moment of transition 
 
Although the interventionist policies operative until the early 1970s were generating 
high rates of private and public capital accumulation in most of the advanced capitalist 
FRXQWULHVDQGWRDOHVVHUGHJUHHDFURVVWKH*OREDO6RXWKµWKHGHEWFULVLV¶RIWKHV
and 1980s severely undermined both the effectiveness of this model, and the esteem in 
which it was held in institutional terms.57 Responding to the crisis, governments began 
to retreat from direct participation in the economy, shifting their energies to calibrated 
administrative actions and regulatory interventions.58  
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And so from the middle of the 1970s, and intensifying during the first half of the 
1980s, the strong relationship between nation-building and the development project 
entered into crisis. Around this time, both the international commitment to the idea of 
Third World development and the enthusiasm for lending resources to states in the 
South receded, and were replaced by a series of strong criticisms and disciplinary 
measures directed toward them. National governments in the South were denounced by 
international institutions, as well as by new local elites, as unrepresentative of nation-
ZLGHLQWHUHVWVDQGZHUHXUJHGWRDWWHQGWRWKHPDVVLYHO\µXQHYHQ¶GHYHORSPHQWZLWKLQ
their national territories, a phenomena that in many instances had been created by 
earlier developmental interventions. These included alarming differences between urban 
and rural populations, men and women, and amongst ethnic groups. Centrally planned 
development programmes, public industries and private industries supported via public 
funds were also now denounced as economically inefficient, fiscally irresponsible, and 
incapable of generating the resources to service the accumulated foreign debt of states. 
In tandem with these accusations, governments in the Global South began to be accused 
for their poor human rights recordVDQGµGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLWV¶59  
 
In this context, policies based on state contraction and market-based approaches 
gained pre-eminence, particularly within the programmes of structural adjustment 
imposed throughout the South by international institutions. These infamous reforms 
began with the IMF interventions throughout Latin America during the debt crisis of the 
1980s.60 As a result of these interventions, governments of Argentina to Mexico ± to be 
followed by many other countries across the South who hosted similar visits by 
international institutions ± had to acquiesce to a systematic programme of privatisation, 
reduction of its public service, trade liberalisation and the shrinking of its social 
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programmes.61 These policies, ideationally underpinned by neo-classical economics, 
were dictated by international institutions largely via conditionality agreements, and 
implemented by national elites.62 They aimed to overcome the assumed deficiencies 
associated with state economic and social interventionism, and to remake the 
conception of citizenship according to new principles of individual productivity and 
consumer satisfaction. These approaches were encapsulated in a series of doctrines that 
LQUHWURVSHFWEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµ:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV¶63 Such policies aimed to 
reshape state administration, reconfigure the relationship between state and market, and 
to promote a vision of citizens as economic agents with commercial initiative, economic 
judgment, and a duty of self-preservation. 
 
The shift towards a more fluid understanding of the role of states and their 
populations in relation to market forces was accompanied by the dismissal of the central 
function that had been assigned to national governments in the development project. 
The dismantling of the USSR and the fall of the Berlin Wall were understood to 
confirm this need to move away from state-based development. This critical view of the 
state was epitomized in the World %DQN¶VWorld Development Report: The Challenge 
of Development published in 1991.64 The initial lines of the report encapsulate the drift 
away from the state as the main force behind the idea of development: 
 
The 1990s began ZLWKGUDPDWLFFKDQJHV«$JDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRIWKHVH
transitions, this ... Report links the historical debates that counseled 
policymakers in their past decisions, the lessons of experience, and the 
evolving thought on how best to proceed. One of the most valuable lessons 
relates to the interaction between the state and the market in fostering 
development. Experience shows that success in promoting economic 
growth and poverty reduction is most likely when governments 





and in which governments concentrate their interventions on areas in which markets 
SURYHLQDGHTXDWH¶66 This new paradigm dramatically reshaped the landscape of 
development and quickly became a new orthodoxy in the field. In the early 1990s, a 
constrained view of the state and strong support for market-based solutions was 
embraced by international institutions and policy circles, and confirmed by sweeping 
governmental reforms and constitutional amendments in many South countries.67 In 
these new constitutions, trade liberalisation, privatisation, and strong supports for 
private property rights were enshrined alongside national commitments to protect 
human rights and foster democracy.68 This new approach to development also 
underpinned the emergence of new institutions and international discourses that further 




But by 1997, and responding to the apparent realisation that the market 
economy, like any other market, needs state support, the World Bank began to 
reconsider its position with respect to the role of the state in the development project. 
By this point it was starting to step back from the radically constrained view of the state 
it had embraced just a few years before. In its World Development Report for 1997, 
aptly titled The State in a Changing WorldWKH%DQNH[SORUHGµZKDWWKHVWDWHVKRXOGGR
how it should do it, and how it can do it betteULQDUDSLGO\FKDQJLQJZRUOG¶70 The 




LW WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WRGD\¶V LQGXVWULDO HFRQRPLHV LQ WKH QLQHWHHQWK
FHQWXU\ RU WKH SRVWZDU JURZWK ³PLUDFOHV´ RI (DVW $VLD )DU IURP
supporting a minimalist approach to the state, these examples have shown 
that development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, 
facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private 
businesses and individuals.71 
 
Based on this revised assessment, the World Bank suggested that (Southern) states still 
KDGDUROHWRSOD\LQµUHGXFLQJSRYHUW\DQGIRVWHULQJVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶72 
+RZHYHUWKLVQHZUROHZDVWREHIXOILOOHGE\DµQHZGHYHORSPHQWVWDWH¶DVWDWHWKDW
looked and behaved rather differently from the old developmental state with its 
commanding, centralised, and reformist impulses. 
 
IV. The new developmental state 
 
After a long decade of structural reform policies, widespread social unrest, and the 
evident failures of many of the reforms, a new series of principles began to surface in 
national and international institutions and policy circles about the proper role of the 
state in the project of development.73 The consensus which emerged during the mid-
1990s suggested a more malleable view of the state. Instead of the state being imagined 
as an entity with a defined character and a pre-established role in the development 
procHVVWKHµ3RVW-:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV¶UHFRPPHQGHGDPRUHIOH[LEOHUHODWLRQVKLS
between the public and private sectors and the decentralisation of state development 
programmes. Both reorientations were accompanied by a greater use of law in 
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development initiatives. These two new axioms and the instrumental use of law became 
the bedrock of the model that emerged during the late 1990s, and that still largely 





privatisation of public industries (strategies that are still being implemented in many 
places), the new approach is to set up legal frameworks, guiding principles and 
ownership arrangements that bring private capital and its imperatives to the terrain of 
public action. Such arrangements are common in the context of large infrastructure 
projects. In order to secure such deals, states in the developing world are newly 
DWWHQWLYHWREHLQJSHUFHLYHGDVSURYLGLQJDµJRRGEXVLQHVVFOLPDWH¶LQZKLFKSULYDWH
FDSLWDOFDQµVDIHO\¶ flourish both independently and through its partnerships with a 
welcoming state.74 
 
The reconfigured relationship between the state and private capital is also 
UHIOHFWHGLQWKHFUHDWLRQRISUHVFULEHGORFDOHVRUµ]RQHV¶LQZKLFKWD[FRQFHVVLRQV
relaxed laws and special infrastructure are provided to investors to create local 
employment opportunities and expand the market for national products.75 At the same 
time, global corporations are being rehabilitated as developmental actors, through new 
requirements which seek to address the significant impacts of their activities through 
mechanisms such as community consultations which try to ensure that private capital 
brings at least some benefits to local communities.76 The discourse of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the vocabulary of Corporate Citizenship also aim to recognise and 
expand the developmental impact of corporations. These vernaculars provide global 
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FRUSRUDWLRQVZLWKOHJLWLPDF\DVµGHYHORSPHQWDFWRUV¶DVZHOODVPRGDOLWLHVWKURXJK
which to take an active role in the shaping of coPPXQLWLHV¶SUHVHQWDQGIXWXUHV77  
 
Woven together with this reconfigured relation between the state and private 
DFWRUVLVWKHHPHUJHQFHRIZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµWKHHQWUHSUHQHXULDOVWDWH¶78 These are 
states which reassert their role in the economy, but do so operationally according to 
private managerial logics.79 This is increasingly common within the resource sector and 
in the provision of public services such as electricity, water, and sanitation. In the case 
of public utilities, this has had harsh effects, almost invariably increasing the cost of 
accessing public services, and embodying a stricter approach to the provision of 
services to informal settlements.80 In the particular case of newly public extractive 
industries, governments in the South are now becoming less tolerant of resistance by 
local communities and indigenous groups protesting the penetration of their territories.81 
 
More recently still, the reconfigured relationship between private and public 
interests has found an additional expression in the citizenry of the new developmental 
state, now themselves imagined to be the agents of their own development. Abandoning 
the collective ideals that underpinned developmental thinking in the era of 
modernisation and the old developmental state, today governments address citizens as if 
individuals were sovereign over their own destinies. And if this is demonstrably not the 
case, because of low income, lack of education, or a marginal legal position, subjects 
are expected to acquire that sovereignty ± the ability to stand on their own feet ± with 
minimal amounts of state support. Examples include micro-credit schemes, cash-
transfer, land titling programmes and neighbourhood legalisation schemes, as well as 
the moves to formalise informal vendors that have been widely implemented across the 
South in recent years.82  
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Behind these technocratic new developmental strategies lies an understanding of 
individual agency as existing beyond structural conditions. This view springs from 
several decades of constructing an image of individuals as being both oppressed by 
heavy national bureaucratic machineries, and as able to interact productively with 
market forces once they are provided with the necessary educational and institutional 
endowments.83 $PDUW\D6HQ¶VµFDSDELOLWLHVDSSURDFK¶WRGHYHORSPHQWKDVEeen 
influential in this regard.84 His view of individuals rests upon an understanding of 
equality as equality of opportunity. Such an understanding is grounded in an image of 
VRFLHW\µRUJDQL]HGDVDFRPSHWLWLYHJDPH¶WDNLQJSODFHXSRQDOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOG 
characterisHGE\µIDLUUXOHV¶85 And if these fair rules do not exist, it is assumed that they 
can be created, at least to a satisfactory level. This ideal level is, of course, a constantly 
shifting ground, raised or lowered according to the structural conditions dominating the 
economic possibilities of individual states. As a result, in a highly competitive global 
political economy that is constantly readjusting chains of production to the cheapest 
sources of labour, and where any progression in terms of poverty alleviation is outpaced 
by growing wealth disparity, the myth of a level playing field underpinned by fair rules 
becomes both a virtual policy goal and a disempowering political strategy. 
 
The second operational imperative of the new developmental state, which feeds 
and supports the first, is the decentralisation of the state in territorial, fiscal, 
administrative and political terms. Often ignored by analysts, decentralisation has 
become an important force behind the restructuring of Third World states, and the wider 
global order, for the last two decades.86 Again marking an increased deployment of law 
as instrument, this has been accompanied by a plethora of legal reforms which 
reallocate responsibilities between central governments and new developmental actors. 
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These reforms include national constitutional amendments which aim to recalibrate the 
responsibilities between national and local governments, non-governmental 
organisations, religious groups, private actors, and individuals themselves. 
 
This recalibration has seen cities and municipalities throughout the South join 
the cast of new developmental actors, often bypassing national governments altogether 
and entering into direct partnerships with other entities, both international and national. 
,OHDQD3RUUDVKDVFDOOHGWKLVSURFHVVWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIFLWLHV¶WRGHVFULEHDVKLIW
that has involved the reallocation to local administrations, responsibilities previously 
understood as national and international, and a new role imagined for cities on both the 
national and international plane.87 These shifts have been cast by both international 
institutions and associations of local governments as emancipatory, because they move 
away from the highly centralised old developmental state, and are responsive to new 
models of capital accumulation that have rejected state based patterns and which 
connect local markets and consumers directly with the routines of transitional capital. 
 
In this reconfiguration of the state, decentralisation has come to operate as a 
powerful political ideal. Within national and local governments, regional organisations, 
and at the highest levels of international institutions, there are mounting expectations 
about the potential of cities to operate as sites in which fairer, more economically 
intelligent and more humane models of development can be implemented.88 However, a 
focus on the putatively emancipatory dimension of decentralisation can serve to draw 
attention away from the more conservative frameworks which are shaping the actual 
functioning of local administrations. These frameworks, developed by international and 
national institutions and often keenly implemented by local elites, are exemplified by 
the World %DQN¶VXUEDQSROLF\Cities in Transition89 which identifies the challenges the 
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Bank understands to be facing Third World cities, and sets out the principles by 
interactions between the Bank and local administrations should be governed. Although 
the principles strive for more amenable cities, all action is consistently determined by 
the expectation that cities remain financially sustainable as discrete entities on one hand, 
and on the other, that all cities enter into a constant competition with both neighbouring 
cities and cities globally, in order to become socially and economically attractive to 
investment. The securitisation of cities by new community police forces, new 
surveillance technologies and private security companies is but one outcome of this new 
reality.90 
 
As a result, local administrations in the Third World now have the constant 
anxiety of striking a balance between conflicting imperatives. So, for example, cities 
must provide universal access to drinking water within their jurisdictions at a time when 
water companies have been privatised, and when most of the city's residents cannot 
afford to pay their water bills.91 Such scenarios have become the day-to-day reality of 
local municipalities which face the widening set of responsibilities imposed upon them 
by their national administrations, international institutions, and the fluctuations of the 
international economic and financial order. Although powerful, the discourse of human 
rights, in this context, can only ameliorate the most extreme cases and is hardly ever 
able to ignite long lasting changes. 
 
Thus the operative paradigm of decentralisation has come to replicate in the 
local context, the scenario that previously played out on the national level. However, 
WKLVSURFHVVRIµGLVFLSOLQLQJWKURXJKGHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ¶XQIROGVLQDVHWWLQJPDUNHGE\
multiplying levels of governance and a proliferation of cross-enforcing legal regimes, 
such as a tight interaction between international norms, national administrative and 
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fiscal laws, transnational private regulations, and local development and urban norms. 
These levels of governance and cross-enforcing legal regimes come directly to shape 
local populations and spaces. Understood in these terms, the operation of the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWDWDµORFDO¶VFDOHKDVQRWLQDXJXUDWHGDSRVW-national 
moment. Instead, decentralisation has provided an opportunity to recalibrate the 
operation of a project of state-making through a more refined, but at the same time more 
expansive approach to population and territory. 
 
Similarly, the new attention to the local does not imply that the international 
development project is finally making good its promises of world prosperity. Instead 
what we often see is an intensification of the contradictions that have accompanied the 
development enterprise since its inception. Residents may have benefitted from local 
administrations being more involved in providing services, and at least in theory, from 
the contraction of the democratic distance to the service provider. But as localised social 
life becomes more determined by international obligations and the economic order, poor 
rural areas, low-income municipalities, and informal urban settlements and their 
residents are being subjected to an increasing pressure to reshape themselves into the 
new parameters of the new developmental state and, perhaps most importantly, to a 
world economic order that increasingly treats them as surplus populations, totally 
irrelevant to the market.92 
 
For all of these reasons, decentralisation has had critical impacts on both popular 
SROLWLFVDQGRQFLWL]HQV¶HYHU\GD\UHODWion with the state. With local administrations and 
many other actors more actively involved in local life, but lacking enough resources or 
interest, the process of decentralisation has often rearticulated itself, drawing 
established political and social networks into a new mesh of official or quasi-official 
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politics and procedures and agencies. But this shift has not necessarily translated into 
more effective forms of social empowerment and welfare.93 Running alongside this, 
µFLWL]HQVKLS¶± a longstanding category of national unification ± is now under siege as 
decentralisation makes it difficult for people marginal to the official legal and economic 
order to find their place, or even a space for their claims to be heard. For many 
occupying the margins of the new geographies brought about by decentralisation, the 
QHZJOREDODWWHQWLRQWRWKHORFDOKDVPHDQWWKHXQUROOLQJRIZKDWZHPLJKWFDOOµD
SHGDJRJ\RIGLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶UHVXOWLQJIURPFXUUHQWIRUPVRIORFDOSODQQLQJDQGILVFDO
disciplining, disaggregated lines of responsibility amongst local, national and 
international levels of governance, and the proliferation of authorities representing such 
levels, alongside shrinking spaces for any meaningful contestation.94  
 
The new developmental state thus promotes an image of the state as a molecular 
structure that actualises the expansion of the market and the flow of international capital 
across national boundaries facilitated through multiple scales of governance. In this 
arrangement, international norms and aspirations, and the tensions that they embody and 
transmit, have become thoroughly entangled with the everyday of the South. It is from 
this entanglement between international law and everyday life that the state is made and 
remade.  
 
V.  Conclusions and further transitions? 
 
In the disciplinary mythology of international law,95 WKHµPRGHUQ¶QDWLRQ-state 
(understood as both sovereign and self-grounding) was born with the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, spread during the time of colonial expansion, and through the 
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march of history, came to take proper shape in the independence of the Americas and 
the decolonisation of the rest of the Global South after the Second World War.96 In this 
P\WKRORJ\µLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶FRPHVLQWREHLQJWKURXJKLQWHU-state practices that 
happen during norm producing moments, whether exceptional or routine. The 
µKLVWRULFDO¶WUDMHFWRU\RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZµLWVHOI¶LVDOVRDVWRU\RISURJUHVVLYH
modernisation ± its foundations shifting from Christianity to Secularity, its modality 




But as we have tried to show in this article, it is possible to understand the 
relation between nation-states and international law differently, particularly if we 
concentrate on how that relation has played out in the Global South from colonial times 
to today. To reorient our understanding, we need to see nation-states as social and 
cultural formations which are constantly trying to reshape disparate spaces and people 
into one ± national ± jurisdiction through administrative procedures, official 
imaginaries, and shared legal, financial and affective economies. Re-described in this 
ZD\WKHRVWHQVLEO\µKLVWRULFDO¶SURFHsses which both deliver nation-states into the world 
and ground the authority of international law, can be seen instead as ceaseless practices 
of what we might think of as nation-state-making, which are inter-national in both 
nature and orientation. The proliferation of nation-states across the South with 
decolonisation allowed a new model of international order to emerge. This order 
RSHUDWHVYLDDµIRUPDO¶SDULW\DPRQJVWQDWLRQ-states and a technicalised developmental 
discourse in which formerly imperial relations were transformed into a renovated vision 




But allocating the responsibility and challenge of development to Southern 
states has not only marked the human and geographical spaces where the development 
project must be carried out. It has also allowed a clear separation of the realities of 
Third World nation-states from the larger international and historical context. Social, 
political, environmental and financial crises stemming from colonial pasts, failed 
development policies and debt accumulation can, in this way, be cast as technical 
problems belonging to individual nation-states and their national and now also local 
administrations. Importantly, this occurs while the promise of global development 
continues to enable international interventions that encourage a particular kind of global 
integration, [in which states are reshaped in ways which promote and protect the gains 
of the (transnational) few]. International law supports this process by facilitating, 
DPRQJVWRWKHUSURFHVVHVµWKHDGRSWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFODZVZKLFKIDFLOLWDWH
the globalisation of production and finance through creating and protecting global 
property rights, codifying the rights of transnational corporations, and limiting the 
economic autonomy of sovHUHLJQVWDWHV¶97 All of this occurs, as spaces and groups that 
resist the idea of development are suppressed and reFDVWDVEHLQJDJDLQVWµQDWLRQDO¶
interests or outside the inevitable laws of (capitalist) modernity.  
 
But although these are practices usually now associated primarily with the idea 
RIµGHYHORSPHQW¶DQGSDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKWKHUHPHGLDWLRQRIµGHYHORSLQJ¶µIDLOHG¶
µIUDJLOH¶RUµWUDQVLWLRQDO¶VWDWHV98 nation-state-making is an ongoing activity for all 
states. States in the North are increasingly seeing themselves transformed into 
developmental states of sorts too.99 At the same time, the global extension of the 
developmental state-making project has happened with further shifts in the character of 
the states being made. Both the new developmental state, and the post-Washington 
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Consensus in which it is grounded, are being reshaped by policies increasingly being 
reformulated by the new developmental powers and both traditional and new donors, 
from philanthropic capitalists to new evangelical churches.100 1HZµFRQVHQVXV¶SROLFLHV
have also emerged expressed, for example, as the Beijing Consensus of 2004 and the 
Seoul Development Consensus of 2010. These shifts came in tandem with the lead up to 
WKH*OREDO)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV*)&RI3XWDWLYHO\µVXGGHQ¶EXWORQJHULQWKH
PDNLQJWKH*)&EURXJKWWKHVWDWHµEDFNLQ¶LQRUGHUWREHDUWKHUHJXODWRU\DQGILQDQFLDO
costs of the policies implemented over the preceding decades, which had given explicit 
support to the expansion of private interests. The GFC also propelled large amounts of 
capital from the economically deteriorated North, to Southern nations101 ± which, after 
years of structural adjustment reform, were now well disciplined and open to market 
forces.  
 
The even newer developmental state that has resulted from this process is one 
still geared towards market solutions, but one which bears an even larger responsibility 
in terms of sponsoring private initiatives, whilst offering further security through legal 
LQVWUXPHQWVDQGDUHJXODWRU\HQYLURQPHQWFKDUDFWHULVHGE\µODZDQGRUGHU¶PHDVXUHV
The global extension of the developmental state making project has had particularly 
(in)famous ± and negative ± consequences for those located in the South of the South, 
as well as in the Southern parts of the North, geographically and metaphorically 
speaking. Greece, Portugal, Spain and all of the poor, de-industrialised and often 
racialised and undocumented communities in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and France for example, today all bear the burden of technologies of state making that 
were once reserved for the Global South.102 With that come amplifying processes of 
resistance, increasingly connected across such places. Popular neighbourhoods in 
Southern cities, scattered rural communities here and there, and indigenous peoples in 
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each nation-state are speaking about this particular world that international law has 
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